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CHAPTER 1
A Comparative View on the Execution
of judgments of the European Court of
Human Rights
Tom Barkhuysen and Michiel L van Emmerikl
I. INTRODUCTION
While the general effect of the European Convention of Human Rights
(ECHR or Convention) on national law has been the topic of much
research, little attention has been paid to the execution of individual judg-
ments of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR or Court). With
regard to the execution of judgments, two levels can be distinguished. The
first level is the execution of the judgment in the individual case. Which
remedies are offered to the applicant who has taken the long road to
Strasbourg and has finally-mostly after many years-won his or her case?
Does the applicant see any improvement in his or her legal position? Does
he or she obtain real reparation? The second level is State compliance in a
more abstract or general sense. What are the more general effects of judg-
ments in which the Court finds a violation of the Convention? In other
words: which measures does the contracting State have to take in order to
prevent future violations in similar cases?
Proper execution of Strasbourg judgments is highly important; both for
the applicant who has won his or her case, and for the development of the
national legal order concerned, in order to prevent future violations. The
international control over the observance by States of human rights treaties
by means of individual applications does not only aim at general effects
(recours objectif), the control also aims at 'doing justice' in individual cases
(recours subjectif). Therefore the execution of Strasbourg judgments
deserves much more structural attention than it has received so far.
1 Tom Barkhuysen is an Associate Professor of Public Law, Leiden University, Netherlands,
Practising Member of the Amsterdam Bar, Visiting Fellow BIICL, Michiel L van Emmerik is a
Legal Adviser at the Constitutional and Legislative Affairs Division, Ministry of the Interior,
The Hague, Netherlands. He expresses his personal point of view. This chapter is based on two
lectures by the authors at the BllCL conference 'European Court of European Rights:
Remedies and Execution of Judgments', London, 28 Oct 2003.
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Important questions to be answered are: (a) how Strasbourg judgments
are implemented in the various national legal orders of the Member States
of the Council of Europe, (b) whether there is a need to improve this imple-
mentation, and if so, and (c) how such improvement can be achieved. In this
respect, it is also important to determine which remedies are~r must be-
available to third parties-that is, those persons whose cases were not
decided in Strasbourg but where a violation of the Convention has never-
theless occurred, as may be concluded from a similar or parallel case that
has been decided in Strasbourg."·
This paper will deal with the execution of Strasbourg judgments, both in
individual cases and in a more general sense, where the prevention of future
violations is concerned. This will be done from a non-United Kingdom
perspective. Without going into the details of the practices of the various
Council of Europe States, we will try to outline some general characteristics
and trends with regard to the execution of Strasbourg judgments. In doing
so-witness our choice of examples used-we put in evidence our Dutch
background. Yet the Dutch examples also illustrate the problems and solu-
tions possible in other Council of Europe States.
The aim of this chapter is to provide a basis for further research and,
possibly, improvements in (State) practice with regard to the execution of
ECtHR judgments.
We will discuss the following subjectsr'
• State obligations following the finding of a violation by the ECtHR and
the remedies offered at the international level (para 2);
• Remedies in individual cases offered at the national level (para 3);
• A closer look at the practice of other Council of Europe States with
regard to the reopening of proceedings before domestic courts as a possi-
ble remedy in individual cases (para 4);
• General State compliance: prevention of future violations (para 5);
• Council of Europe enforcement of judgments and proposals for reform
(para 6); and
• Concluding remarks (para 7).
2 Mainly based on the contributions to T Barkhuysen, ML van Emmerik, and PH van
Kempen (eds) The Execution of Strasbourg and Geneva Human Rights Decisions in the
National Legal Order (Kluwer Legal IntemationallMartinus Nijhoff Publishers The Hague
1999) and PH van Kempen Heropening van Procedures na Veroordelingen door het EHRM
[Reopening of Proceedings after ECtHR Condemnations], (PhD thesis Wolf Legal Publishers
Tilburg University Nijmegen 2003).
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The first question to be answered with regard to the execution of
Strasbourg judgments is which State obligations arise from the finding of a
violation by the Court.
A. Restitutio in integrum and Prevention of Future Violations
Decisions of the ECtHR are declaratory in nature: the ECtHR establishes
whether or not a State has violated the Convention in the case at hand.
Pursuant to Article 46 ECHR, judgments are only binding to the parties in
that particular case.I From this same article of the Convention the follow-
ing obligations arise: (a) to terminate the violation with regards to the appli-
cant, (b) to provide the applicant with restitutio in integrum (that is
restoring the situation prior to the violation), and (c) to take measures to
prevent future violations (also with regard to other individuals similarly
affected by the violation, for instance by changing the law)."
However, the Court is not competent to quash national legislation or
decisions which are contrary to the ECHR, nor does it have the power to
revise final decisions of national courts. Neither does the ECtHR consider
itself to be in a position to issue certain orders to the State party to the
Convention. The Court does not even consider it competent to make
recommendations to the condemned State as to which steps it should take
to remedy the consequences of the treaty violation. According to constant
case law of the Court, the condemned State is, pursuant to Article 46
ECHR, free to choose the means by which to comply with the Court's judg-
ment and to offer restitutio in integrum. For instance, in the case Pelladoah
v The Netherlands the ECtHR rejected the applicant's request to order the
State to reopen the national criminal proceedings.f This freedom as to the
3 See on this inter alia R Ryssdal 'The enforcement system set up under the European
Convention on Human Rights' in MK Bulterman and M Kuijer (eds) Compliance with
Judgments of International Courts (The Hague 1996) 50. Cf, however, J Callewaert, Art 53 in
LE Pettiti, E Decaux, and PH Imbert (eds) La Convention europeenne des droits de l'bomme,
Commentaire article par article (Paris 1995) 847-56 (855-6), who on the basis of Arts 1 and
57 [52] ECHR presupposes the existence of a certain erga omnes effect of these decisions.
4 See, eg, G Ress 'The effects of judgments and decisions in domestic law' in R StJ
Macdonald, F Matscher, and H Petzold (eds) The European System for the Protection of
Human Rights (London 1993) 801-51 (803-4); SK Martens 'Individual complaints under
Article 53 [46] of the European Convention on Human Rights' in R Lawson and M de Blois
(eds) The Dynamics ofthe Protection ofHuman Rights in Europe: Essays in Honour ofHenry
G Schermers (vol III) (London 1995) 253-92 (263-75).
5 ECtHR 22 Sept 1994, Pelladoab/The Netherlands: the conviction of an applicant in
absentia without offering his legal representative the opportunity to defend the applicant by
addressing the court orally, is in contravention of Art 6 ECHR.
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choice of means is, however, not unlimited, as the Vermeire case has made
clear. In this case the Court, briefly stated, deemed it necessary for the
national court to act when the legislator would take too long in imple-
menting a Strasbourg decision.6
B. Just Satisfaction if restitutio in integrum is Not Possible (In Full)
After having established that a Convention violation has taken place, the
ECtHR has the power to award the victim 'just satisfaction', where appro-
priate, on the basis of Article 41 ECHR.. This alternative, consisting of
compensation, only applies if the domestic legal system does not allow for full
restitutio in integrum.The Court givespriority to restitutio in integrum, which
in practice, however, will often be impossible, either because the damage
caused is irreversible or because the ECtHR lacks the power to quash national
decisions or to issue certain orders. H the Court awards damages on the
ground of Article 41 ECHR, the obligation on the basis of Article 46 is clear:
the condemned State has to pay the amount awarded to the applicant.
According to the wording of Article 41, a condition for the award of
just satisfaction is that the national law of the State party to the
Convention does not allow for full reparation of the consequences of the
treaty violation. The Court has, however, interpreted its competence on the
basis of Article 41 very broadly and considers it free to award damages
whenever these are claimed by the applicant, irrespective of the national
means for reparation. The ECtHR awards damages on grounds of equity
and has used this power numerous times. The Court awards financial
compensation for both material and non-material damage. The award of a
sum of money is the most frequently used form of compensation in the
Court's practice. This sum may also include compensation for costs
incurred by the applicant, both in the national procedure and in
Strasbourg. However, research into the Court's practice pursuant to Article
41 ECHR shows that the Court often does not award any damages at all.
In fact, the Court often only states, without giving reasons and without
regard to the national possibilities for reparation that the mere finding of
a violation of the Convention constitutes sufficient satisfaction in cases
where damage is of a non-pecuniary nature. Besides, claims for compensa-
tion of non-pecuniary damage are often rejected with the consideration
that the Court cannot enter into speculation as to whether the national
procedure would have ended differently if the conditions imposed by the
Convention had been complied with.
6 ECtHR 29 Nov 1991, VermeirelBelgium. This case concerns the implementation of
ECtHR 13 June 1979, Marckx/Belgium.
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C. Unsatisfactory Practice with Regard to Offering Remedies
It follows from this that many applicants who 'win' their case in Strasbourg
will nevertheless feel that they have been left empty-handed by the Court.
To date, the insufficiently guaranteed and hardly consistent Strasbourg
practice of offering remedies and awarding damages renders acute the
demand for proper national possibilities for redress.
III. REMEDIES IN INDMDUAL CASES OFFERED AT THE NATIONAL LEVEL
Therefore, let us now look at the remedies that could be offered in individ-
ual cases at the national level after the finding of a violation by the ECtHR.
A study of the various legal systems of the Council of Europe shows that in
theory one can think of a relatively wide range of possible remedies to be
offered in national law in order to achieve restitutio in integrum or to
provide compensation after a condemning judgment by the Strasbourg
Court. Four main remedies can be distinguished.
A. Revising or Revoking National Administrative Orders Found to be
Violating the ECHR
The first remedy is that national administrative orders found to be violat-
ing the Convention are revised or revoked. The authorities in most of the
Council of Europe Member States in principle have this power. However, if
third party interests are involved, the authorities must in principle refrain
from using this power. The protection of legal certainty with regards to
these third parties must prevail in such a case. This means that the remedy
of revising or revoking orders is most useful in cases in which no third
parties are directly involved, such as immigration cases or tax cases. An
example of the use of this remedy could be the revocation of an expulsion
order after the Strasbourg Court has ruled that this expulsion is contrary to
eg Article 3 ECHR because of the real risk of inhuman or degrading treat-
ment in the home country.
B. Pardon (Acquittal) or Sentence Reduction in Criminal Cases
In criminal cases a remedy could be the pardoning of a convicted person
leading to his/her acquittal, for instance, after the ECtHR has found a viola-
tion of Article 6 of the Convention because of the use of improper evidence.
Sentence reduction can also be used in response to a Strasbourg judgment.
A Dutch lower court has, for instance, ruled that the sentence imposed on
a convicted criminal had to be reduced by 10 per cent because according to
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the ECtHR he was subjected to a prison regime that was not in conformity
with Article 3 of the Convention. This judgment was recently upheld by the
Dutch Supreme Court.
The acquittal of convicted criminals following a Strasbourg judgment
can meet with a lot of criticism, both from the applicants concerned and
from society. Let us explain this by an example. As a reaction to the
Strasbourg condemnation in the Van Mechelen case concerning the use of
anonymous witnesses in criminal proceedings where the Court held this to
conflict with Article 6 ECHR,7 the applicants whose petition was upheld
were (provisionally) set free. Apart from that, they received
compensation-fairly modest in comparison to their claim-on the basis of
Article 41 ECHR, an outcome which was not satisfactory for the applicants
as they were unable to show their innocence and therefore could not receive
reasonable damages for the sentence already served. Furthermore, their
criminal record was left unchanged. For others who were still convinced of
the applicants' guilt this outcome was also unsatisfactory because they
believed that there were no grounds for the release and considered even
modest damages to be out of place. As a result of this case, arguments were
raised in favour of a new remedy to follow a Strasbourg 'conviction',
consisting of the reopening of closed criminal proceedings, so as to revise
the national decision with due regard for the Strasbourg judgment. This
brings us to the next remedy.
C. Reopening of Proceedings that have been Closed with a Decision
having res judicata Power
As research shows, a considerable number of Council of Europe Member
States nowadays provide for the possibility of reopening proceedings that
have been closed with a decision having res judicata power. This with a
view to revising the decision concerned, with due regard for the judgment
of the ECtHR., both in respect of material and procedural matters follow-
ing from it.8 In the case of Van Mechelen v The Netherlands, mentioned
earlier, this remedy would have meant that the criminal proceedings would
have been reopened, but then without the use of anonymous witnesses (as
its use was found to be contrary to Article 6 ECHR). We will deal with this
remedy in more detail later. As in many cases it seems to be an ideal means
for the execution of Strasbourg judgments. However, problems could arise
in cases where third party interests are involved.
7 ECtHR 23 Apr 1997, Van Mechelen aoffhe Netherlands.
8 Van Kempen 2003; Committee of Experts for the improvement of procedures for the
protection of human rights 'Reopening of proceedings before domestic courts following find-
ings of violations by the ECtHR' DH-PR (99)10 Strasbourg 9 Aug 1999.
7The Execution ofJudgments of the ECHR
D. Suing the State for Tort
A fourth remedy is the instigation of tort proceedings against the State. The
State could be obliged to pay damages because of wrongful judicial acts or
because of other wrongful acts of State authorities. This remedy might also
be a good alternative in cases that cannot be reopened because of the third
party interests just mentioned. Such a claim is indeed merely directed
against the State and does not have the direct consequence of altering the
legal position of a party involved in the original proceedings. The legal force
of the original judgment remains intact. As far as we are concerned, this is
a new kind of procedure in which the correctness of the original judgment
is not primarily at issue.
Tort liability for wrongful (judicial) acts would not only fit in well with
the developments in Council of Europe Member States, but also with the
increasing liability of the State for legislative and administrative failure. In
this respect, a kind of no-fault State liability is also assumed in many States
for failings of the legislative and executive powers resulting from an error
at law. Similar developments can be discerned in European Community law.
It obliges Member States to compensate damage which can be attributed to
them and which has been suffered by individuals as a result of breaches of
Community law, whereby it is immaterial which State body has committed
the violation. In this respect the ruling of the Luxembourg Court of Justice
in the case Kobler v Austria is of interest. In this case, the Court of Justice
ruled that EC law obliges States to provide for the possibility to sue the
State for tort on the national level because of a breach of EC law by the
highest national courts." Moreover, State liability could lead to national
courts paying more attention to the obligations laid down in the ECHR
(including Strasbourg case law) in order to prevent claims for damages.
A condition for making this remedy effective would be that liability is in
principle assumed when Strasbourg finds a violation of the ECHR.
However, this condition is not met in all Council of Europe Member States
(eg until now, Dutch case law shows a great reluctance to this).10
9 ECj 19 Nov 199;(~tcases C-6/90 and C-9/90, Francovich and Boniiad, Jur 1991 1-
5357. Further specifi&t'in Eej 5 Mar 1996, joint cases C-46/93 and C-48/93, Brasserie du
Pecheur and Pactortame III, Jur 1996, 1-1029; ECj 26 Mar 1996, C-391193, British
Telecommunications, Jur 1996 1-1631. See with regard to violations of EC-Iaw by the judi-
ciary, ECj 30 Sept 2003, C-224/01, Koebler.
10 See for proposals with regard to this T Barkhuysen and ML van Emmerik 'Legal
Protection Against Violations of the European Convention on Human Rights: Improving the
(Co-joperation of Strasbourg and Domestic Institutions' [1999] Leiden journal of
International Law 833-45.
8 Tom Barkhuysen and Michiel L van Emmerik
IV. A CLOSER LOOK AT THE PRACIlCE OF OTHER COUNCIL OF EUROPE STATES
WITH REGARD TO THE REOPENING OF PROCEEDINGS BEFORE DOMESTIC COURTS
AS A POSSIBLE REMEDY IN INDIVIDUAL CASES
One of the possible remedies just described, the reopening of closed
proceedings, deserves special attention as the Committee of Ministers has
recommended Member States to implement this possibility in their national
legal systems.l! According to the Committee of Ministers this possibility is
in some cases the most efficient, if not the only, means of achieving restitu-
tio in integrum.
In this context it should be stressed that the Convention does not oblige
States to act upon this recommendation (the recommendations of the
Committee of Ministers are not binding). There is only a legal obligation to
remedy the violation found, but the Convention does not prescribe the
means by which this should be achieved. Nevertheless, in our opinion, the
reopening of proceedings seems in many cases the ideal means to fulfil the
restitutio in integrum obligation unless third party interests were prejudiced
by the reopening of the case.
However, some important questions have to be discussed when intro-
ducing a reopening procedure. Such as:
• in which field or fields of law should reopening be possible?
• how to deal with third party interests?
• with regard to what type of violation of the ECHR (procedural rights
only or also material rights) should reopening be possible?
• time limits?
• who can ask for reopening?
• which authority should decide on a reopening request?
• what to do with similar cases that have not been brought to Strasbourg?;
etc.
Research by the Council of Europe (1999) and, more recently by van
Kempen (2003), shows that State practice with regard to the reopening
possibility and its various features is by no means uniform.V Some coun-
tries do not have any reopening possibility at all. Several countries-a
majority of the Council of Europe Member States-have provisions that can
be used in the field of criminal law. Provisions in the field of civil and
administrative law are less common, which to a certain extent can be
explained by the involvement of non-State third parties in many cases in
11 Recommendation R (2000)2 of 19 Jan 2000.
12 Van Kempen 2003; Committee of Experts for the improvement of procedures for the
protection of human rights, 'Reopening of proceedings before domestic courts following find-
ings of violations by the ECtHR', DH-PR (99)10, Strasbourg 9 Aug 1999.
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these fields of law for whom legal certainty needs to be protected. In coun-
tries where such a reopening is a possibility, it can be based on a provision
specially focussing on ECtHR judgments, or on a general provision that
also covers other grounds for reopening proceedings such as new facts that
are decisive for the outcome of the case (nova). Some countries have one
special provision, covering criminal, civil, and administrative law (like
Switzerland and Malta). In Norway, a case can be reopened (on the basis of
a general provision) in reaction to a-formally non-binding-finding of the
Human Rights Committee that monitors the Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights. With regard to some other countries the situation is unclear
as these countries do not have reopening provisions specially focussing on
ECtHR judgments, but have instead general reopening provisions and it is
unclear whether these can be used in reaction to a Strasbourg judgment.
For further information on a country-by-country basis we refer to the
following overview prepared by means of the research mentioned.
OVERVIEW OF THE NON-UK STATE PRACTICE WITH REGARD
TO THE REOPENING OF PROCEEDINGS BEFORE DOMESTIC
COURTS FOLLOWING FINDINGS OF VIOLATIONS BY THE
EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS13
1. Special provisions with regard to ECtHR judgments
Criminal law
Germany, Greece, France, Luxembourg, Austria, Netherlands, Belgium,
Italy (limited), Bulgaria, Croatia, Lithuania, Norway, Poland, Slovenia
Civil Law
Bulgaria, Lithuania, Norway
Administrative law
Bulgaria, Lithuania, Norway
All fields of law (one provision)
Malta, Switzerland
13 Based on the research of van Kempen 2003; Committee of Experts for the improvement
of procedures for the protection of human rights, 'Reopening of proceedings before domestic
courts following findings of violations by the ECtHR', DH-PR (99)10, Strasbourg 9 Aug 1999.
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2. General reopening provisions that can also be used with regard to
ECtHR judgments
Criminal law
Denmark (probably), Finland, Sweden, Andorra (probably), Estonia (prob-
ably), Albania (probably), Moldova (probably), Ukraine (probably),
Macedonia (probably)
Civil Law
Denmark (probably), Germany (prcbably], Finland, Luxembourg (proba-
bly), Sweden (probably), Croatia, Poland (probably), Andorra (probably)
Administrative law
Denmark (probably), Germany (probably), Finland (probably), Austria,
Sweden (probably), Croatia, Poland (probably), Estonia (probably)
AU fields of law
Iceland (probably), Hungary (probably), Russia (probably), Slovakia (prob-
ably), Czech Republic (probably), Turkey (probably), Romania (probably),
3. No reopening possibilities
Criminal law
Liechtenstein
Civil Law
Belgium, France, Greece, Italy, Austria, Netherlands, Estonia, Albania,
Moldova
Administrative law
Belgium, France, Greece, Italy, Luxembourg, Andorra, Netherlands,
Albania, Moldova
AU fields of law
Ireland, Spain, Cyprus, Latvia
4. Unclear
Civil law
Slovenia, Ukraine, Macedonia, Liechtenstein
Administrative law
Slovenia, Ukraine, Macedonia, Liechtenstein
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All fields of law
Portugal, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bosnia, Georgia, San Marino
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The Netherlands has recently introduced a reopening possibility specially
directed at ECtHR judgments in criminal cases. A request for reopening can
be filed with the Supreme Court within a period of three months after the
ECtHR judgment. A request can be filed by the applicant who has won
his/her case in Strasbourg, but also by the Procurator General. The latter
can also use this power against the will of the applicant, a feature of the
Dutch regulation that has met with a lot of criticism. Third parties-that is,
persons whose cases were not decided in Strasbourg but in which a viola-
tion of the Convention has occurred, as may be concluded from a similar
or parallel case as decided in Strasbourg--eannot file a request for reopen-
ing. A proposal with regard to Dutch civil law will be discussed in the near
future. A proposal for the reopening of administrative law cases is also
being prepared in the Netherlands.
v. GENERAL STATE COMPliANCE: PREVENTION OF FUroRE VIOLATIONS
A. The ECHR and the Legislative Process
Now we turn to general State compliance. In dealing with this subject we
will focus in particular on the perspective of the Dutch legislator.
It is undeniable that the importance of the ECHR in the legislative
process in the Netherlands has grown, especially in the last two decades,
with the expanding case law of the Strasbourg Court. Throughout the first
20 years of its existence, the Court only delivered a few judgments per year
(and sometimes no judgment at all). Nowadays, the Court is almost buried
under its caseload.
A good and early example of the influence of Strasbourg case law on
Dutch legislation is the 1982 Act on the equalization of illegitimate and legit-
imate children in Dutch succession law. This Act is a reaction to the 1979
judgment of the European Court of Human Rights in the case Marckx v
Belgium in which the Court found that Belgian family law, which discrimi-
nated between legitimate and illegitimate children, constituted a violation of
Article 8 (right to family life) in conjunction with Article 14 (prohibition of
discriminationl/This Dutch~)eceived retroactive effect from 13 June
1979, the date of the MarckX Judgment. This is an example of a case in
which the Dutch government followed a rather expeditious way to imple-
ment a Strasbourg Court judgment, even though the judgment was directed
against another State (the Belgian State only altered its legislation in 1987).
But it has to be admitted that the Dutch government showed less willingness
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in other cases where the Netherlands had been condemned by the European
Court.
Only in the last few years the influence of the ECHR on the legislative
process has become increasingly significant. You only have to search for the
word 'ECHR' (of-course in Dutch you will have to look for 'EVRM') in the
Dutch database for official governmental documents, including proposals
of law and all kinds of parliamentary documents (the website is
<http://www.www.overheid.nl», to find numerous hits. Let us just mention
some proposals of law in which the requirements of the ECHR played an
important role:
• Project of law concerning administrative detention. This proposal was
made because of Euro 2000, the European Soccer Championships in
Belgium and the Netherlands, and it made it possible to detain so-called
'soccer fans' in order to prevent them from committing offences. In the
Explanatory Memorandum of the government to the proposal of law and
in the parliamentary debates--especially in the Upper House-the require-
ments of Article 5 ECHR (the right to liberty), played an important role;
• Project of law concerning the insertion of a section on administrative
penalties in the General Administrative Law Act: The requirements of
Article 6 ECHR are very relevant in this respect as administrative penal-
ties constitute 'criminal charges' within the meaning of this article;
• Project of law regarding the obligation to identify oneself: Article 8 (right
to privacy). This proposal of law was recently sent to parliament;
• Project of law regarding camera surveillance: Article 8 (right to privacy).
Furthermore, it is noteworthy that in recent years the right to property,
contained in Article 1 of Protocol 1 to the ECHR, seems to have been
discovered in legal practice, and that this article is gaining more attention
in the legislative process. In different proposals of law, ranging from the Pig
Breeding Act to acts in the field of social security, the government refers to
the obligations arising from the right to property. That is not to say that this
always leads to the conclusion that there is a possible violation of the
requirements of Article 1 of Protocol 1, but at least there is attention to this
right. On the other hand, the possible preventive effect of these require-
ments must not be underestimated. For example, the Dutch government
accepted an amendment from an opposition party relating to the proposal
of law regarding the reimbursement of costs in administrative proceedings.
The proposal was meant to reduce the possibilities of cost reimbursement
in administrative proceedings as the original government proposal aimed to
give retroactive effect to the Act for already pending cases. The amendment
aimed at deleting this retroactive effect and was motivated by the require-
ments of Article 1 of Protocol 1 of the ECHR, as interpreted in the case law
of the European Court of Human Rights.
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B. Implementation ofJudgments of the ECtHR
In general, the implementation of decisions of the ECtHR in the
Netherlands is not a problem. When damages are awarded, the Dutch State
always pays the sums awarded by the Court in a timely fashion. The same
holds true for settlements agreed before the Court between the Netherlands
and the applicant. In such settlements the payment of a certain sum of
money may be agreed upon in combination with other measures.
As regards to the general effects of Strasbourg decisions, Dutch practice
is also acceptable. The rapidity with which legislation is amended may
differ from case to case, but the conclusion may safely be drawn that there
is a willingness to bring legislation and practice in line with Strasbourg stan-
dards, even in cases where another State party is condemned. We will give
some examples of the implementation of judgments against the
Netherlands.l"
Winterwerp
Mr Winterwerp suffered from a mental illness, which resulted in his
compulsory confinement to a psychiatric hospital, where his confinement
was extended to several years. After considering the merits of the case the
Court found a breach of Article 5 § 4:
the various decisions ordering or authorizing Mr Winterwerp's detention issued
from bodies which either did not possess the characteristics of a 'court' or, alterna-
tively, failed to furnish the guarantees of judicial procedure required by Article 5 §
4; neither did the applicant have access to a 'court' or the benefit of such guarantees
when his requests for discharge were examined, save in regard to his first request
which was rejected by the Regional Court ... 15
As a result of the Winterwerp case, the Dutch Minister of Justice issued
a set of 'guidelines' by way of interim response; the relevant Dutch legisla-
tion was already under review when the Winterwerp case was decided.
However, changing the law proved to be a long-term process. In fact, the
new legislation did not enter into force until 1994, when the Netherlands
had been condemned in Strasbourg in two more cases for having violated
the rights of mental patients under Article 5 of the Convention.
14 The description of these examples is derived from C Engering and N Liborang
'1udgments of the European Court of Human Rights against the Netherlands and their effects:
an overview 196o-199't\ in T Barkhuysen, ML van Emmerik, and PH van Kempen (eds) The
Execution of Strasbourg~neva Human Rights Decisions in the National Legal Order
(Kluwer Legal IntemationaVMartinus Nijhoff Publishers The Hague 1999) 29-61.
15 ECtHR 24 Oct 1979, Winterwerpffhe Netherlands.
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XandY
Miss Y was living in a home for mentally handicapped children. At the age
of 16 she was sexually assaulted by Mr B. Her father Mr X filed a
complaint with the police, since Miss Y was mentally ill and therefore
unable to complain by herself. The public prosecutor did not prosecute
because the complaint had not been filed by the victim herself as required
under the Dutch Criminal Code. Mr X and Miss Y complained to the
European Court stating that their rights to respect for their private lives
under Article 8 of the Convention had been breached.l" The Court agreed,
finding that the Netherlands had a positive obligation to assure Miss Y
adequate means to obtain a remedy.
As a result of the X and Y case the Dutch Criminal Code was amended:
a complaint can now be lodged by the victim's legal representative if the
victim is mentally handicapped to such an extent as to be incapable of
deciding for himlherself whether it is in hislher interest to lodge a
complaint.
Benthem
In the Benthem case the Dutch system of administrative justice proved not
to be in accordance with the right to a fair and public hearing by an inde-
pendent and impartial tribunal within the meaning of Article 6 § 1 ECHR.
Mr Benthem, a garage owner, applied for a licence to operate an instal-
lation for the delivery of liquid petroleum gas (LPG). Initially the municipal
authorities granted the licence. However, after the Regional Health
Inspector advised them to refuse the licence, they ordered Mr Benthem to
cease operating his installation. Mr Benthem lodged an appeal against this
decision, but it was confirmed by the Crown, ie the Queen and the Minister
issued a Royal Decree. Mr Benthem complained to the European Court that
Article 6 § 1 of the Convention had been breached because his case was 'not
decided by an independent and impartial tribunal. After judging the merits
of the case the Court indeed found a breach of Article 6 § 1 of the
Convention:
the Royal Decree (Koninkli;k Besluit) by which the Crown as head of the executive
rendered its decision constituted from the formal point of view an administrative act
and it emanated from a Minister who was responsible to Parliament in this respect.
Moreover, the Minister was the hierarchical superior of the Regional Health
Inspector, who had lodged the appeal, and of the Ministry's Director General, who
had submitted the technical report to the Division. Finally, the Royal Decree was not
susceptible to review by a judicial body as required by Article 6 § 1.
16 ECtHR 26 Mar 1985, X and ylfhe Netherlands.
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Two years later, as a result of the Court's judgment in the Benthem case,
the system of Appeal to the Crown (Kroonberoep) was abolished and
temporarily replaced by the Crown Appeals (Interim Measures) Act
(Tijdelijke Wet Kroongeschillen). In 1994, a new General Administrative
Law Act came into force.
Judgments against other States
It is not only judgments against the Netherlands that might be of relevance
for Dutch legislation, but also judgments delivered against other State-
parties may be very relevant, as illustrated by the example of the Marckx
case. The Supreme Court case law uses the so-called 'incorporation
construction' relating to Strasbourg judgments whereby the authoritative
interpretations of the Court are considered part of the individually binding
treaty provision to which they apply. On a national level the judgments
have therefore a certain erga omnes effect, not only for the judiciary but
also for the legislator. However, it is often very difficult to discern the exact
implications of Strasbourg judgments for the national legal system. Due to
the growing number of Strasbourg judgments, it is becoming increasingly
difficult to follow and analyse the actual state of the case law let alone the
possible importance of admissibility decisions, which can also be very
important for the interpretation of ECHR obligations.
Let us give some examples of judgments against other State-parties with
possible effect on Dutch (draft- )legislation
In the case Colas Est v France, the applicants were road construction
companies. In 1985, they were investigated as part of an administrative
inquiry in which investigators from the Directorate General for
Competition, Consumer Affairs and Repression of Fraud investigated 56
companies at the same time and seized several thousand documents from
which they ascertained that illicit agreements had been made concerning
certain contracts. The investigating officers entered the premises of the
applicant companies pursuant to the provisions of an order dating from
1945. On the basis of the seized documents, the Minister for Economy,
Finance and Privatisation referred the matter to the Competition Council,
which fined the applicants for engaging in illegal practices. The applicants
appealed to the Paris Court of Appeal, challenging the lawfulness of the
searches and s~izures, which had been executed without a warrant. The
Court of Appeal fined the first applicant five million francs, the second
applicant three million francs, and the third applicant six million francs.
The Court of Cassation dismissed their appeals. Relying on Article 8 of the
Convention (right to respect for private and family life) the applicants
submitted that the searches and seizures, which had been conducted by the
investigating officers without any supervision or restriction, amounted to
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trespass against their 'home'. The Court held that the time had come to
acknowledge that in certain circumstances the rights guaranteed by Article
8 of the Convention could be construed as including the right to respect for
a company's head office, branch office or place of business. The Court
found that the investigators had entered the applicants' premises without a
warrant, which amounted to trespass against their 'home'. The relevant
legislation and practice did not provide adequate or sufficient guarantees
against abuse. The Court considered that at the time tl}e relevant authority
had very wide powers and that it had intervened without a magistrate's
warrant and without a senior police officer being present. The Court held
unanimously that there had been a violation of Article 8.17
At present there is a legal debate in the Netherlands as to what effect the
Colas Est judgment should have for Dutch legislation in the field of compe-
tition law. According to Dutch competition law it is possible to conduct
inquiries at companies without permission or prior approval by a judicial
authority. This is in contrast to the investigation of the 'home' of a natural
person, which enjoys stronger protection in Dutch (constitutional) law. It is
important that the government examines thoroughly what the exact mean-
ing of the Colas judgment is for the guarantees that companies can derive
from the right to respect for private lifelhome as contained in Article, 8. Our
impression is that the Ministry of Economy (responsible for legislation in
the field of competition law) only took notice of this judgment and its possi-
ble relevance for Dutch law after some publications in Dutch legal doctrine.
Earlier, the case of Proeola v Luxembourg, in which the Court held that
the Supreme Administrative Court's successive performance of advisory and
judicial functions relating to the same decisions could cast doubt on that
institution's structural impartiality,18 led to much debate in the Netherlands
about the position of the Council of State. In a governmental note sent to
Parliament in 1997, the position was taken that there was no problem with
the status of the Dutch Council of State in regard to the Procola judgment.
In the recent case Kleijn v The Netherlands, the Court held that the ques-
tion before the Court was whether, in the circumstances of the case, the
Administrative Jurisdiction Division had the requisite appearance of inde-
pendence or the requisite objective impartiality.l? The Court found nothing
in the manner and conditions of appointment of the Netherlands Council
of State's members or their terms of office to substantiate the applicants'
concerns regarding the independence of the Council of State. Nor was there
any indication of any personal bias on the part of any member of the bench
that had heard the applicants' appeals against the Routing Decision.
17 ECtHR 16 Apr 2002, Colas Est/France.
18 ECtHR 28 Sept 1995, ProcolalLuxembourg.
19 ECtHR 6 May 2003, Kleijnffhe Netherlands.
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The Court was not as confident as the Government that the internal
measures taken by the Council of State, with a view to giving effect to the
Procola judgment in the Netherlands, were such as to ensure that in all
appeals the Administrative Jurisdietion Division constituted an impartial
tribunal under Article 6 § 1. However, it was not the Court's task to rule in
the abstract on the compatibility of the Dutch system with the Convention
in this respect. The issue before the Court was whether, in regard to the
applicants' appeals, it was compatible with the requirement of objective
impartiality that the Council of State's institutional structure had allowed
certain of its councillors to exercise both advisory and judicial functions.
At present the government is preparing its answer to this judgment. A
note on the position will soon be sent to parliament. Our expectation is that
the Kleijn judgment will also lead to some legislative changes.
Finally we mention the case JB v Switzerland, in which the applicant
alleged that the criminal proceedings against him were unfair and contrary
to Article 6 § 1 (right to a fair trial) in the sense that he was obliged to
submit documents which could have incriminated him. The applicant, who
had had tax evasion proceedings instituted against him, was requested on
various occasions to submit all the documents concerning the companies in
which he had invested money. He failed to do so on each occasion and was
fined four times.
The European Court of Human Rights noted that the right to remain
silent and the right not to incriminate oneself were international standards
at the heart of the notion of a fair procedure under Article 6 § 1 of the
Convention. It appeared that the authorities had attempted to compel the
applicant to submit documents which would have provided information as
to his income in view of the assessment of his taxes. The applicant could
not exclude that any additional income which transpired from these docu-
ments from untaxed sources could have constituted the offence of tax
evasion.
The Court held unanimously that there had been a violation of Article 6
§ 1.20
This judgment is very relevant for the preparation of the project of law
concerning the insertion of a section on administrative penalties into the
General Administrative Law Act. This proposal contains an article concern-
ing the right to remain silent and in the Explanatory Memorandum to this
article much attention is paid to Strasbourg case law, in particular to the
judgment in the case Saunders v United Kingdom21 and to the JB judgment.
It is often very difficult to discern the precise meaning and scope of
Strasbourg judgments. Generally, the Court takes a very casuistic approach
20 ECtHR 3 May 2002, IB/Switzerland.
21 ECtHR 17 Dec 1996, Saunders/United Kingdom.
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and it elucidates its findings very briefly. Therefore, it can be very difficult
to draw conclusions that apply beyond the specific case in question. It is
advisable for the Court to give more concrete guidelines in its case law (eg
by giving a more elaborate motivation for its decisions), although we are
aware of the fact that the Court already has an enormous case load. Such
guidelines may help to prevent future Strasbourg applications in similar
cases.
C. Monitoring Cases Before and Judgments of the ECtHR
At present, the Dutch government is not able to monitor Strasbourg judg-
ments on a structural basis. The governmental 'system' of monitoring
Strasbourg judgments is in contrast with the present structure of monitor-
ing the judgments of the EC Courts in Luxembourg (Courts of First
Instance and Court of Justice of the European Communities). There exists
an Inter-Departmental Commission on European Law (lCER). This
Commission, composed of civil servants of all departments, examines on a
structural basis what are (or will be) the effects of (future) judgments of the
EC Courts in Luxembourg. In this way it is possible to identify at an early
stage the possible effects of these judgments for Dutch legislation. It also
makes it possible to anticipate future judgments.
In our opinion a similar structure should be set up for the monitoring of
judgments and admissibility decisions of the European Court of Human
Rights in order to provide the government with adequate expertise on the
ECHR and the Strasbourg case law. The government should invest in suffi-
cient facilities (time and money), especially civil servants with expertise in
the field of the ECHR, and in particular persons who are able to extract the
possible consequences of Strasbourg decisions for particular branches of
Dutch law. In this way, it can be assured as best as possible that Dutch legis-
lation complies with the requirements of the ECHR and that future
condemnations by Strasbourg are prevented. In our opinion this positive
human rights result is well worth the investment!
As shown, it is very important that States keep a constant eye on the
developments in Strasbourg case law and try to be pro-active. This also
means that States have a direct interest in the outcome of cases against other
States. The possibility of intervening as a third party (Article 36 ECHR)
could be used to serve these interests as, for instance, many countries have
done in the case A v United Kingdom on parliamentary immunities.V
However, there is no policy of structural use of this possibility as the case
Colas Est/France shows. In this case, none of the other Member States inter-
vened even though it concerned the very important question of whether
22 ECtHR 17 Dec 2002, A/United Kingdom.
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companies were also protected under Article 8 ECHR against seizure of
company documents, which question the Court answered in the affirmative.
Since this decision of the Court has a large impact, third party intervention
would have been worthwhile.
D. Conclusions on General State Compliance
Apart from executing ECtHR judgments in the individual cases concerned,
States also have the obligation to prevent future violations of the
Convention in similar cases. This can mean that legislation or a standing
administrative practice has to be changed. Likewise, ECtHR rulings can
lead to a change in national case law with regard to a certain topic. The
ECtHR judgment in the case Goodwin v United Kingdom,23 for instance,
led to a change in the case law of the Dutch Supreme Court with regard to
the protection of the journalistic privilege, ie the right of journalists not to
name their sources.
Although a judgment of the Court formally binds only the State which is
a party to the proceedings in question, it frequently happens that other
States nevertheless draw legislative or other consequences from it. In our
opinion, this should be welcomed because the general rules that can be
drawn from judgments can be seen as part of the treaty obligations of all
Member States. Furthermore, not taking into account judgments against
other States would force individuals to bring cases before the Court even
when it is clear from the start that the Convention has been violated. Taking
into account the time and energy that the individuals concerned and the
already overloaded Court have to spend on such cases, it is clear that this
should be prevented if and when possible. Furthermore, it could be argued
that not taking into account judgments against other States in certain cases
could run against the State obligation to fulfil treaty obligations in good
faith.
At the same time it must also be concluded that it is not always clear
from a judgment which abstract measures should be taken to prevent future
violations. Most Court judgments are very much based on the specific facts
of the case, which makes it difficult to infer general rules from them. This
is made even more difficult by the fact that extensive grounds are lacking in
many judgments. At this point the Court could change its practice in order
to enhance the ynpact of its judgments. Finally, the State concerned could
also ask (more frequently) for an interpretation of a judgment by the Court
in order to clarify its exact meaning.
23 ECtHR 27 Mar 1996, GoodwinlUnited Kingdom.
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VI. COUNCIL OF EUROPE ENFORCEMENT OF JUDGMENTS AND PROPOSALS
FOR REFORM
Now that we have dealt with the execution of Strasbourg judgments both
in individual cases and in the abstract, we can have a closer look at the
supervision of the execution process. Who checks whether the State
concerned fulfils its obligations under the ECHR and-if it fails to do so-
are there any possibilities to enforce the judgment? We will first concentrate
on the current supervision and enforcement system (6.1) and then review in
brief the most important proposals for reform of this system, recently put
forward (6.2).
A. Current Supervision and Enforcement System
Under Article 46 ECHR the Committee of Ministers supervises the execu-
tion of the Court's judgments. This supervision takes the form of monitor-
ing whether the State has executed the judgment in the individual case by
restitutio in integrum and/or payment of damages on the basis of Article 41
ECHR. The Committee also monitors whether the necessary legislative or
administrative reforms have been instituted in order to prevent future viola-
tions. The Committee does not regard its supervising role with regard to a
certain case as finished until it has satisfied itself-on the basis of informa-
tion supplied by the State- that the State has fulfilled its obligations aris-
ing from the judgment. The conclusion that a judgment has been properly
implemented will be formalized by the adoption of a resolution by the
Committee in which the information supplied by the State is also
mentioned. This resolution is made public and can be a good source for
research with regard to the execution of judgments. If a State fails to
execute a judgment, the Committee may decide on the measures to be taken
against this State (for instance: a political condemnation, suspension of the
right to vote at the Committee of Ministers, or expulsion from the Council
of Europe).
The record of States in executing the Court's judgments can be regarded
as relatively good. Although some States need a lot of time to implement
appropriate measures, in the end the Committee can conclude in most cases
that the judgment has been properly executed. This shows that the judg-
ments of the Court have acquired a highly persuasive status in the various
Member States. On the other hand, it has to be said that more and more
States are becoming increasingly reluctant to execute judgments against
them and try to find ways to minimize the possible impact of these judg-
ments. It is also because of this development that the Parliamentary
Assembly of the Council of Europe is trying to gain more control over the
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execution of judgments. The Assembly is now informed on a regular basis
on the execution records of the Member States and tries to use its (politi-
cal) influence whenever problems arise.
However, the individual concerned (the applicant who has won his or
her case) has no formal role in the supervision procedure, although they
could try to draw the attention of the Committee of Ministers to a judgment
that has not been properly executed. The Olsson II v Sweden case24 shows
that so far the ECtHR has not been prepared to deal separately with the
complaint that a previous Court judgment has not been (properly)
executed. The applicants in this case asked the Court to condemn Sweden
for a violation of Article 46, which the Court refused. From this case it can
also be deduced that so far, the Court is not willing to override a decision
of the Committee of Ministers that a certain judgment has been properly
executed, although scholars have argued that it is the Court and not the
Committee that should have the last word in this respect. The Court has
confirmed this reluctant position in its admissibility decision in the case
Lyons v United Kingdom.25 In this case, the Court found the complaint of
the applicants-that by refusing to reopen a closed national procedure and
to take into account the condemnation by the Court in an earlier judgment
(19 September 2000, IjL, GMR and AKP v United Kingdom), there was a
'new' breach of Article 6 § 1 and a breach of Article 13 ECHR-inadmis-
sible. The Court stresses the exclusive role of the Committee of Ministers
with regard to the execution of judgments and is of the opinion that there
is no new breach of the Convention. In this respect the Court states that the
Convention does not give it jurisdiction to direct a State to open a new trial
or to quash a conviction.
B. Proposals for Reform
As most of you might know, the large workload of the ECtHR results in
most applicants having to wait too long for a decision in their case. The
huge number of cases reaching Strasbourg could undermine the position of
the ECtHR. It is therefore not surprising that the Committee of Ministers
had asked a special committee, the Steering Committee for Human Rights
(CDDH), to prepare proposals in order to guarantee the long-term effec-
tiveness of the ECtHR. The Steering Committee's final report,26 contained
proposals on three levels: (a) domestic remedies, (b) the Court's procedure,
and (c) the execution of judgments.
The Committee of Ministers welcomed the proposals with regard to the
24 ECtHR 27 Nov 1992, Olsson II/Sweden.
2S ECtHR 8 July 2003, Lyons and others/United Kingdom.
26 CDDH, Guaranteeing the long-term effectiveness of the ECtHR, Final report containing
proposals of the CDDH, adopted on 4 Apr 2003, CDDH(2003)006 Final.
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execution, the Steering Committee produced a draft protocol for the imple-
mentation, which was discussed by the Committee of Ministers in May
2004. The proposals aimed to improve and accelerate the execution of
judgments and cope with some of the problems that have been mentioned
before. The three most important proposals were the following.
.Proposal Cl of the Steering Committee recommended that the Court, by
a resolution of the Committee of Ministers, should be asked to identify in
its judgments what it considers to be an underlying systematic problem and
the source of this problem. In this way, the Court could assist States in find-
ing the appropriate solution and the Committee in supervising the execu-
tion of judgments. Repetitive applications could be avoided in this way.
Proposal C2 suggested that the supervising procedure before the
Committee of Ministers is organized in such a way that it promotes the
rapid solution of systematic problems and, where necessary, the problems
of violations already committed and qualified for being brought before the
Court or already before the Court. It also proposed to strengthen the
department for the execution of judgments. This could mean that the execu-
tion of pilot judgments would be given priority and much publicity.
Furthermore, the Parliamentary Assembly would be more closely involved
in the execution process.
Proposal C4 is of a really fundamental nature. According to this
proposal, the Convention should be amended to enable the Committee of
Ministers to institute proceedings before the ECtHR against a State that
clearly refuses to comply with a judgment in order to obtain a finding by
the Court that Article 46 ECHR has been violated, possibly combining this
with a financial sanction. A comparison can be made with the infraction
procedure under EC law that enables the Commission to bring cases against
member States before the ECJ.
In our opinion the proposed measures are to be welcomed, although it is
a little disappointing that no (formal) role is proposed for the applicant who
has won their case and is confronted with execution problems. The fact that
no proposals are made with regard to the remedies that should be offered
to the applicant who has won hislher case can also be viewed with a criti-
cal eye.27 This, however, is not surprising because the proposals of the
Steering Committee mainly aim to reduce the workload of the Court. It
rests to see whether these important proposals from the Steering Committee
will be adopred.P'
27 Seefor proposals with regard to this Barkhuysen and Van Emmerik 1999.
28 For further details on the draft protocol please refer to E Bates 'Supervising the Execution
of Judgments Delivered by the European Court of Human Rights: The Challenges Facing the
Committeee of Ministers' below p 49.
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So far, we have presented our glance at several key aspects of the execution
of ECtHR judgments. As said before, the main questions to be answered
are: (a) how Strasbourg judgments are implemented, (b) whether there is a
need to improve this implementation, (c) if so, how such improvement can
be achieved (with measures on the national as well as on the international
level), and (d) whether in this respect, lessons can be drawn from the prac-
tice in other Member States. We hope this paper will raise the appetite for
further discussion on these questions.
